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Abstract
Some empirical evidence in the artificial language acquisition literature has been taken to sug-
gest that statistical learning mechanisms are insufficient for extracting structural information from
an artificial language. According to the more than one mechanism (MOM) hypothesis, at least two
mechanisms are required in order to acquire language from speech: (a) a statistical mechanism for
speech segmentation; and (b) an additional rule-following mechanism in order to induce grammati-
cal regularities. In this article, we present a set of neural network studies demonstrating that a
single statistical mechanism can mimic the apparent discovery of structural regularities, beyond
the segmentation of speech. We argue that our results undermine one argument for the MOM
hypothesis.
Keywords: Artificial grammar learning; Speech processing; Language acquisition; More than one
mechanism hypothesis; Statistical learning; Connectionism
1. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, the great debate about the architecture of cognition (e.g., Fodor &
Pylyshyn, 1988; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) has remained at the forefront of work on
language acquisition and speech processing. The question is whether speech can be
processed—or indeed whether language could be acquired—solely by statistical learning
mechanisms, or whether rule-following mechanisms are required. Evidence that both infants
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and adults can segment speech using statistical mechanisms like the computation of transi-
tional probabilities (TPs) among syllables (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Saffran,
Newport, & Aslin, 1996) convinced many that statistical mechanisms are involved in lan-
guage acquisition and speech processing. Numerous papers in the last two decades demon-
strate the power of statistical mechanisms (to name but a few: Christiansen & Chater, 1999;
Hare, Elman, & Daugherty, 1995; Plunkett & Juola, 1999; Redington, Chater, & Finch,
1998; Seidenberg, 1997). In fact, in recent years, more sophisticated forms of statistical
learning have been reported. Both infants and adults can even segment speech using back-
ward, rather than forward, TPs (Pelucchi, Hay, & Saffran, 2009; Perruchet & Desaulty,
2008). The debate then focused on whether statistical mechanisms are sufficient for the pur-
poses of language acquisition and speech processing. The exchange about ‘‘rule learning’’
in infants (Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Seidenberg & Elman, 1999a) is
one illustration.
Notwithstanding the consensus that statistical mechanisms could lie behind word seg-
mentation (see below), the claim that a statistical mechanism might suffice for the induction
of grammar remains contentious. Poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments (e.g., Chomsky, 1980)
have convinced many that purely statistical mechanisms embedded in artificial neural net-
works (Seidenberg & Elman, 1999a, 1999b) or in human subjects (Saffran, Newport, et al.,
1996) cannot account for the acquisition of language as a whole. Although speech may be
segmented on the basis of distributional information, rule-following mechanisms that rest
upon the manipulation of symbolic structures seem to be required in order to perform gram-
matical induction.
In this environment, Peña, Bonatti, Nespor, and Mehler (2002a), and more recently
Endress and Bonatti (2007), are among those who have defended a third, ‘‘hybrid’’ possibil-
ity: that statistical and symbolic mechanisms might work together in a compound cognitive
architecture. In their view, multiple mechanisms are needed in order to account for the data
on adults’ ability to acquire an artificial language. Peña et al. (2002a) report experimental
evidence that they argue shows that humans use both statistical learning (to segment speech)
and algebraic computations (to induce structural regularities like grammatical rules). That
is, they argue that statistics are insufficient to support the discovery of underlying grammati-
cal regularities, and that their results imply knowledge of rules. In particular, Peña et al.
(2002a) designed a set of experiments aimed at assessing whether statistical computations
based on TPs of the sort that are exploited in speech segmentation (Saffran, Aslin, et al.,
1996) could also be used in order to induce rule-like regularities in the speech stream. They
familiarized participants with a continuous sequence of artificial ‘‘words,’’ where what
counts as a ‘‘word’’ is a function of the TPs between specific non-adjacent items (see Sec-
tion 1.1 below for the details). In the test phase, participants were asked to choose, from
between pairs of stimuli, which seemed more like a word from the familiarization stream.
For example, one condition required participants to choose between words and items that
had appeared in the familiarization stream but had straddled a word boundary. Another
required participants to choose between items that had appeared in the familiarization
stream but straddled a word boundary and items that had not appeared in the familiarization
stream but respected the TP between specific non-adjacent items, as in the case of words.
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The objective was to test subjects’ ability to segment speech and to generalize beyond the
familiarization stream.
Although participants were able to extract the lexicon based on non-adjacent dependen-
cies (they chose words when compared to other familiarization items that straddled a word
boundary), they failed to generalize beyond the familiarization corpus (did not choose items
that had not appeared in the familiarization stream, but that respected the TP between spe-
cific non-adjacent items when compared to familiarization items that straddled a word
boundary). Participants were, however, able to generalize when subliminal pauses indicating
word segmentation boundaries were inserted into the corpus. Furthermore, participants were
unable to induce the rule even when the duration of familiarization on a continuous stream
was increased substantially. By contrast, participants could generalize after much shorter
durations when the familiarization stream was segmented using subliminal cues. Peña et al.,
therefore, claim that statistics are not sufficient to extract structural information from a
continuous familiarization corpus.
Endress and Bonatti (2007) replicate and extend the Peña et al. results, and attempt to
model them using connectionist networks, taking the argument a step further by claiming
that participants may be tuning to rules at an even higher level of abstraction than Peña et al.
had proposed. Endress and Bonatti are unable to model the experimental results with con-
nectionist networks, and they claim that their failure demonstrates that associative learning
mechanisms are insufficient for language learning. They advocate instead what they call the
‘‘more than one mechanism’’ (MOM) hypothesis, according to which two different compu-
tational mechanisms must be responsible for the results they report: (a) a statistical mecha-
nism for performing speech segmentation; and (b) a rule-governed mechanism responsible
for the induction of grammatical or structural regularities in speech.
We found it surprising that a connectionist network was unable to model human perfor-
mance in this task. We also observed that, although Endress and Bonatti had used a range of
network parameters in their simulations, it would be impossible to test all possible values of
every possible network parameter. In particular, we observed that Endress and Bonatti had
used a relatively small number of hidden units (at most 27) to model the task, and that they
had used only one of many possible combinations of activation function and error function.
We therefore set out to determine whether, by manipulating network parameters, including
the number of hidden units and the activation and error functions, we could model the
behavioral data using a connectionist network.
Indeed, in this article, we report a set of connectionist simulations—based on a single sta-
tistical mechanism—that does model the experimental results of Peña et al. and Endress and
Bonatti. We conclude that they have not demonstrated that rule-governed structure learning
mechanisms are necessary for artificial language acquisition, as their MOM hypothesis sug-
gests. The structure of this paper is as follows. In the remainder of the Introduction, we pro-
vide an overview of the evidence for the MOM hypothesis and explain the challenge for
statistical learning. In Section 2, we report a preliminary analysis of the types of dependen-
cies in the familiarization corpus in the relevant experiments. In the third section, we report
the results of two simulations using artificial neural networks. In the general discussion, we
argue that our results, insofar as the connectionist model employed does not implement
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rules, undermine Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti’s argument for the MOM hypothesis.
We argue, moreover, that their evidence is mostly negative (cases of generalization where a
statistical explanation is not immediately forthcoming), and that when an attempt is made to
provide positive evidence for the MOM hypothesis, it can easily be accommodated within
the more parsimonious general framework we advocate here. Directions for future research
and conclusions follow.
1.1. An overview of the evidence for the MOM hypothesis
Peña et al. (2002a) tested adults’ abilities to segment speech based on non-adjacent
dependencies and to generalize beyond the familiarization corpus. The experiments were
based on roughly the same method as that used by Newport and Aslin (2000). Adult partici-
pants were asked to listen to a sequence of trisyllabic artificial ‘‘words’’ for a certain period
of time. The artificial ‘‘words’’ had the form AiXCi, where Ai, X, and Ci are syllables. The
subscripts on A and C indicate that the non-adjacent syllables are matched, such that the TP
between an Ai and the following Ci is 1.0. There are three X syllables, so the TPs between
an Ai and an intermediate X and between X and the final Ci are each 0.33. There are three
word classes (i2[1,2,3]), and no two adjacent words in the speech stream may be from the
same class, so the TPs between the final syllable of one word Ci and the first syllable of the
next word Aj is 0.5. The three word classes are pu…ki, be…ga, and ta…du. The three filler
syllables are li, ra, and fo. Thus, the A1XC1 family consists of the words puliki, puraki, and
pufoki; the A2XC2 family consists of the words beliga, beraga, and befoga; and the A3XC3
family consists of the words talidu, taradu, and tafodu. Familiarization streams were pro-
duced by concatenating speech-synthesized tokens of these nine words. After familiariza-
tion, participants were asked to choose, between pairs of stimuli, those that seemed more
like a word from the familiarization stream. Test stimuli were of three kinds: ‘‘words’’
(items of the form AiXCi that had appeared in the familiarization stream), ‘‘part words’’
(items that had appeared in the familiarization stream but straddled a word boundary), and
‘‘rule words’’ (items of the form AiX¢Ci that had not appeared in the familiarization stream,
where X¢ stands for a ‘‘familiar’’ syllable, that is, one that occurs in familiarization,
although never between Ai and Ci).
In Peña et al.’s Experiment 1, participants were familiarized with a continuous speech
stream, as described above, for 10 min. In the test phase, they were asked to choose between
a ‘‘word’’ and a ‘‘part word.’’ The result was that participants preferred words over part
words. Experiment 1 is consistent with the hypothesis that statistics alone suffice for speech
segmentation, because what counts as a ‘‘word’’ is a function of the TPs between specific
non-adjacent items (in this case, between Ai and Ci).
In their Experiment 2, Peña et al. investigated whether participants were simply segment-
ing the stream by exploiting different TPs between words and part words, or whether they
were attuning to some more abstract underlying grammatical regularity. In order to answer
this question, participants were asked, after having been familiarized for 10 min to the same
speech stream as in Experiment 1, to choose between a part word and what Peña et al.
dubbed a ‘‘rule word.’’ As it turned out, participants preferred part words over rule words,
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suggesting that they had not extracted the rule from the training stream even though (as
shown in Experiment 1) they had learned to segment the words of the language. Peña et al.,
therefore, claim that their Experiment 2 shows that statistics are not sufficient to extract
structural information from a continuous familiarization corpus. In light of Experiments 1
and 2 together, Peña et al. conclude that a ‘‘computational mechanism sufficiently powerful
to support segmentation on the basis of nonadjacent TPs [experiment 1] is insufficient to
support the discovery of the underlying grammatical-like regularity embedded in a continu-
ous speech stream [experiment 2]’’ (p. 605).
In Peña et al.’s Experiment 3, a ‘‘subliminal’’ 25 ms pause was inserted between each pair
of words in the familiarization stream. Although participants reported no awareness of such
gaps, their presence did affect the results. When participants were trained on a speech stream
with gaps, the participants subsequently preferred rule words to part words at test. In their
view, these results imply knowledge of rules, insofar as the very notion of an abstract rule
word underlies the successful discrimination of rule words and part words. Thus, they write,
‘‘This seems to be due to the fact that the selected items are compatible with a generalization
of the kind ‘If there is a [pu] now, then there will be a [ki] after an intervening X’’’ (p. 606).
In other words, Peña et al. contend that two different computational mechanisms must be
responsible for the results of Experiments 1–3: (a) a statistical mechanism for performing
speech segmentation (Experiment 1); and (b) a rule-governed mechanism responsible for the
induction of grammatical structural regularities in the corpus (Experiment 3).
Peña et al.’s Experiments 4 and 5 tested for preference between part words and rule words
after familiarization on a continuous stream for 30 min or on a segmented stream for 2 min
(see Table 1). In the first case, participants preferred part words over rule words, demonstrat-
ing that even lengthy familiarization with a corpus that does not contain prosodic cues to seg-
mentation does not lead to abstraction of the rule. In the second case, participants preferred
rule words over part words, demonstrating that even very brief familiarization with a corpus
that does contain cues to segmentation leads to abstraction of the rule. Peña et al. interpret the
results in Table 1 as evidence for the MOM hypothesis: a statistical mechanism for segment-
ing the familiarization corpus (Experiment 1), and a rule-governed mechanism that accounts
for the induction of the rule that prefers rule words over part words (Experiments 3 and 5).
Furthermore, Endress and Bonatti argue that participants may not prefer rule words them-
selves, but so-called class words. Class words have the form AiX¢Cj, that is, an A syllable
Table 1
Summary of Peña et al.’s experimental results
Experiment Stream Familiarization Duration Test Choice
1 Continuous 10 min Words over part words
2 Continuous 10 min No preference between
rule words and part words
3 Segmented 10 min Rule words over part words
4 Continuous 30 min Part words over rule words
5 Segmented 2 min Rule words over part words
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from one class, followed by a syllable that had appeared in the speech stream but never in
the middle of a word (as in rule words) from a different class, followed by a C syllable from
the third class. These are called ‘‘class words’’ because they would be preferred if partici-
pants learned rules of the form ‘‘if the first syllable is from the A class, then the last syllable
is from the C class.’’
The constraint that the second syllable must come from a different class than both the first
syllable and the third syllable is not stated explicitly by Endress and Bonatti (2007), who
define class words as ‘‘items with the structure AiX¢Cj; Ai and Cj always occurred, respec-
tively in the first and third positions of words in the stream but never in the same word, and
X¢ is a syllable that occurred in the stream but never in the middle position of words’’ (p.
251). Nevertheless, this constraint is implicit in the list of class word test items in their
Appendix A. There would be 18 class words given the explicit definition that appears in
Endress and Bonatti’s (2007) paper: beduki, bekidu, bepudu, bepuki, betadu, betaki, pubedu,
pubega, puduga, pugadu, putadu, putaga, tabega, tabeki, tagaki, takiga, tapuga, and tapuki.
However, we learned via private correspondence that the set of class words that Endress and
Bonatti actually used in their experiments incorporates the additional constraint that the sec-
ond syllable cannot be from the same class as either the first syllable or the second syllable.
This constraint reduces the number of class words to 12: beduki, bekidu, bepudu, betaki,
pubedu, puduga, pugadu, putaga, tabeki, tagaki, takiga, and tapuga. We are not sure why
the authors imposed this constraint, because the whole idea behind testing class words is that
the middle syllable does not matter—that participants may ‘‘have learned that the first and
the last position in a word are variables that take their values from distinct classes’’ (p. 251).
Nevertheless, in the studies reported below, we describe tests using only the same restricted
set of 12 class words that Endress and Bonatti used.
Table 2 summarizes Endress and Bonatti’s experimental results. Experiments 6 and 7
were designed to control whether subjects considered either the initial or the final sylla-
ble to induce the rule, instead of both. Experiments 10 and 11 were designed to dis-
count the possibility of phonological confounds in their Experiments 1 and 2, and
Experiment 9 was designed to test whether a single mechanism can exploit TPs over
both syllables and gaps. As our objective is to demonstrate that a single statistical
mechanism can model the data that are relevant to the MOM hypothesis (rather than to
develop a psychologically realistic model of speech segmentation), we ignore experi-
ments 6–7 and 10–11. Experiment 9 is a variation of Experiment 3 where pure tones
are used to surround test items. Running simulations where pure tones surrounding test
items were represented, for example, by activation of an untrained input unit would add
nothing substantial to the simulations herewith reported. Therefore, we address Experi-
ment 9 in the general discussion.
Thus, we focus our discussion and simulations in the remainder of this paper upon the
other experiments (1–5, 8, and 12–13), together with Experiments 1–5 by Peña et al.
(2002a). The critical pattern in these experiments is that Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti
find a negative correlation between performance on abstract items and familiarization dura-
tion. Tables 3 and 4 list these experimental results from Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti
(which were ordered by their original experiment numbers in Tables 1 and 2) in order from
1248 A. Laakso, P. Calvo ⁄ Cognitive Science 35 (2011)
Table 3
Summary of Peña et al.’s and some of Endress and Bonatti’s experimental results with a segmented stream, in
increasing order of familiarization duration
Experiment Study Familiarization Duration Test Choice
5 Peña et al. 2 min Rule words over part words
8 Endress and Bonatti 2 min Words over rule words
3 Endress and Bonatti 2 min Class words over part words
12 Endress and Bonatti 2 min Rule words over class words
3 Peña et al. 10 min Rule words over part words
1 Endress and Bonatti 10 min Class words over part words
4 Endress and Bonatti 30 min No preference between class
words and part words
5 Endress and Bonatti 60 min Part words over class words
Table 2
Summary of Endress and Bonatti’s experimental results (adapted from Endress and Bonatti, 2007)
Experiment Stream Familiarization Duration Test Choice
1 Segmented 10 min Class words over part words
2 Continuous 10 min No preference between class
words and part words
3 Segmented 2 min Class words over part words
4 Segmented 30 min No preference between class
words and part words
5 Segmented 60 min Part words over class words
6 Segmented 2 min No preference between AiCjX and XAiCj
7 Segmented 10 min Class words over AiX¢Aj CiX¢Cj
8 Segmented 2 min Words over rule words
9 Segmented 2 min Class words over part words
(surrounded by pure tones)
10 Segmented 2 min Class words over part words
11 Continuous 2 min No preference between class
words and part words
12 Segmented 2 min Rule words over class words
13 Continuous 10 min Rule words over class words
Table 4
Summary of Peña et al.’s and some of Endress and Bonatti’s experimental results with a continuous stream, in
increasing order of familiarization duration
Experiment Study Familiarization Duration Test Choice
1 Peña et al. 10 min Words over part words
2 Peña et al. 10 min No preference between
rule words and part words
2 Endress and Bonatti 10 min No preference between class
words and part words
13 Endress and Bonatti 10 min Rule words over class words
4 Peña et al. 30 min Part words over rule words
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shorter to longer familiarization times, with the goal of highlighting the relationship
between the experimental results and the MOM hypothesis.
The results obtained by Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti on segmented 2-min familiar-
ization streams (Experiments 5, 8, 3, and 12 in Table 3) indicate preferences for words over
rule words, for rule words over class words, and for class words over part words. Their
results on segmented 10-min familiarization streams (Experiments 1 and 3 in Table 3) indi-
cate preferences for class words and rule words over part words. Finally, Endress and
Bonatti’s results on segmented 30- and 60-min familiarization streams (Experiments 4 and 5
in Table 3) indicate no preference between class words and part words, and preference for
part words over class words, respectively. We therefore observe both (a) a rank-order prefer-
ence (words > rule words > class words > part words); and (b) a reversal in this order of
preference between class words and part words (part words > class words) as familiarization
exposures increase in time. On the other hand, the results by Peña et al. and Endress and
Bonatti on continuous 10-min familiarization streams (Experiments 1, 2, 2, and 13 in
Table 4) indicate preferences for words over part words, no preference between rule ⁄ class
words and part words, and preference for rule words over class words. Finally, Peña et al.’s
results on continuous 30-min familiarization streams (Experiment 4 in Table 4) indicate
preference for part words over rule words. The overall reversal of the preferences observed
(Tables 3 and 4) as we move from familiarization exposures of 2 min to those of 60 min
reflects the negative correlation that underpins the MOM hypothesis.
Endress and Bonatti highlight the fact that participants’ responses to class words exhibit a
negative correlation between structural generalization and familiarization duration of much
the same sort that Peña et al. (2002a) had found for rule words. Endress and Bonatti thus
interpret the data (see Table 2) as showing that a dependency is initially induced between
classes of items but degrades with further familiarization. This negative correlation is criti-
cal to the inference that there is MOM at work. Preference for class words over part words
after 2 and 10 min of familiarization is taken as evidence that the participants have learned
a class rule. Endress and Bonatti’s reasoning is that familiarization with a segmented stream
allows participants to focus upon the extraction of the underlying structure from the start,
because they do not need to perform speech segmentation first. As familiarization duration
increases, participants have more time to track the statistical relations that obtain between
tokens in the input stream. Endress and Bonatti’s interpretation is thus that an initially
induced dependency between classes of items degrades with familiarization duration as it
becomes overwhelmed by processing dependencies among speech elements.
1.2. A challenge for statistical learning
Endress and Bonatti (2007) consider whether a simple recurrent network (SRN; Elman,
1990) trained on a prediction task can account for the results of their experiments (Table 2).
An SRN is a connectionist network that incorporates a context layer in addition to the input,
hidden, and output layers found in a feed-forward network. The units in the context layer
receive input from and direct output to the hidden layer. The weights from the hidden layer
to the context layer are fixed so as to copy the contents of the hidden layer to the context
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layer at each time step; the weights from the context layer to the hidden layer are trained by
backpropagation, as are the weights from the input layer to the hidden layer and the weights
from the hidden layer to the output layer. As in a feed-forward network, the units at each
layer transform their inputs using an activation function. Over repeated presentations of
input–output pairs, backpropagation reduces the amount of error at each output unit accord-
ing to an objective function.
In particular, Endress and Bonatti are interested in whether a SRN can induce class words
after being trained on segmented and continuous corpora of the sort employed in their
Experiments 1–8. Endress and Bonatti purport to show that an associative connectionist net-
work cannot account for this pattern. They report a set of studies with SRNs that they claim
shows that a single mechanism like an SRN cannot account both for the preference for class
words exhibited by humans in their experiments and for the negative correlation observed
between class word induction and familiarization duration. In the remainder of this article,
we report and discuss a set of SRN studies that does model the experimental results obtained
by Peña et al. (2002a) and Endress and Bonatti (2007). Our goal is to model, using a single
statistical mechanism, both the early preference hierarchy (words > rule words > class words
> part words) and the reversal that obtains as familiarization durations are increased. As we
shall see below, an interpretation that differs from Endress and Bonatti’s is possible. To
anticipate, participants may not be learning a class rule that, once acquired, gets over-
whelmed with familiarization duration. Instead, as we shall argue, participants rule out non-
acquired class words as familiarization continues. In what follows, we aim to show that a
single statistical learning mechanism can in fact account for all the preference patterns in
Tables 1 and 2, and for the negative correlation for both segmented and continuous corpora
summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
2. Preliminary analysis of types of dependencies in Peña et al.’s corpus
As we saw earlier, Peña et al. (2002a) define a ‘‘word’’ in this series of experiments as a
function of the TPs between syllables in Ai and Ci, respectively. This is for Peña et al.’s pur-
poses of designing their experimental setting, but a number of different generalizations at
several levels of abstraction may underlie the patterns of performance observed in the exper-
iments (e.g., Seidenberg, MacDonald, & Saffran, 2002). Thus, in the same way as subjects
may be tuning to the Ai_Ci rule in virtue of the TP of 1 between the first and the third sylla-
bles in the familiarization corpus, they may also be sensitive to generalizations such as
< AiX is always followed by Ci>, or even <Ai is never followed by Aj>, both generalizations
with a TP of 1. Seidenberg et al. consider many other generalizations that subjects may rely
on when processing the familiarization stream. Thus, in response to Experiments 1 and 2 by
Peña et al., they claim that whereas words are supported, for example, by generalizations
such as <initial syllables begin with a stop consonant>, <final syllables begin with a stop
consonant>, <continuant consonants occur word medially>, among others, part words
obtain their support from a smaller pool of generalizations. This might explain the observed
preference for words in Experiment 1 of Peña et al. Similarly, the pool of generalizations
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that is consistent with both rule words and part words is of the same size (see Seidenberg
et al. for the details). This might help explain why subject preferences for either rule words
or part words converge in Experiment 2 of Peña et al. It is of course not obvious that partici-
pants must be sensitive to all possible generalizations and to their corresponding TPs.
Different types of information may be weighted differently, and the underlying empirical
question in dispute is precisely what sources of information people track as they acquire a
new language. In fact, a number of experiments by Endress and Bonatti (2007) were
designed to control for some of these potential sources of information (see general
discussion). In our view, however, and while acknowledging that these control experiments
have served to discard alternative hypotheses such as the possibility of phonological con-
founds, there is no principled reason to exclude the possibility that subliminal segmentation
gaps can be exploited statistically. The mere fact that these gaps are subliminal does not
prevent them from carrying potentially relevant information. It simply means that their pres-
ence is not available to conscious access. As a matter of fact (as Peña et al. well observe),
they must carry the critical piece of information for the mastery of structural induction,
because the inclusion of the gaps is the only difference between Experiment 2 (where part
words are preferred), and Experiment 3 (where rule words are favored) (Table 1).
Table 5 collects a number of generalizations, with their TPs, for a legal sequence of sylla-
bles in the familiarization corpus subject to the constraints that the TP between any Ai and
the following Ci is 1.0, between any Ai and an intermediate X, and between an X and the
final Ci, are each 0.33, and between any Ci and the next word’s first syllable is 0.5. Table 5
reflects some of the statistical regularities in the corpora, adjacent as well as non-adjacent
(Peña et al.’s Experiments 3 and 5, and Endress and Bonatti’s Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, and
12), that participants have access to, and which may therefore explain their performance.
Although Peña et al. consider a potential rejoinder according to which a single statistical
mechanism may be responsible for the induction of the structural regularity in their
Experiment 3 by tracking TPs over pauses as well as syllables, they dismiss that alternative
Table 5
Some potential generalizations about adjacent and non-adjacent syllables based on the
familiarization sequence … #AiXCi#AjYCj#AkZCk# … (pauses represented by ‘‘#’’)
No. Generalization TP
1 ‘‘#’’ predicts ‘‘Ai’’ 0.33
2 ‘‘Ai’’ predicts ‘‘X’’ 0.33
3 ‘‘X’’ predicts ‘‘Ci’’ 0.33
4 ‘‘Ci’’ predicts ‘‘#’’ 1
5 ‘‘#’’ predicts ‘‘X,’’ after one intervening item 0.33
6 ‘‘Ai’’ predicts ‘‘Ci,’’ after one intervening item 1
7 ‘‘X’’ predicts ‘‘#,’’ after one intervening item 1
8 ‘‘Ci’’ predicts ‘‘Aj,’’ after one intervening item 0.5
9 ‘‘#’’ predicts ‘‘Ci,’’ after two intervening items 0.33
10 ‘‘Ai’’ predicts ‘‘#,’’ after two intervening items 1
11 ‘‘X’’ predicts ‘‘Aj,’’ after two intervening items 0.33
Note. TP, transitional probabilities.
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in a footnote (note 27). The rejoinder is the idea that participants might have computed TPs
to and from the pauses as well as to and from the audible syllables. In that case, they might
estimate that a rule word at test (with the structure #AiX¢Ci#, where ‘‘#’’ stands for a sub-
liminal segmentation gap) was more likely than a part word at test. (Part words can be of
two types: ‘‘type 12’’ part words consist of items having the form CiAjX, whereas ‘‘type
21’’ part words consist of items having the form XCiAj.) The relevant TPs for a rule word
and for part words of type 12 and type 21 (with the structure #CiAjX #and #XCiAj #,
respectively) are shown in Fig. 1.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, whereas a rule word of the form #AiX¢Ci# can in principle be sup-
ported by five different generalizations (1, 4, 6, 9, and 10 in Table 5), part words of type 12
(#CiAjX#) and of type 21 (#XCiAj#) are exclusively supported by generalizations 2 and 3,
respectively (all other adjacent and non-adjacent TPs among syllables are zero). Indeed,
were we to consider just adjacent TPs, rule words would still be supported by two different
generalizations (1 and 4 in Table 5), whereas TPs backing part words of either type reduce
to 0.33 (generalizations 2 and 3 in Table 5). Thus, one might suppose that participants




Fig. 1. Adjacent and non-adjacent transitional probabilities for (A) a rule word having the form #AiX¢Ci#; (B) a
part word of type 12 having the form #CiAjX#; and (C) a part word of type 21 having the form #XCiAj#. Solid
arrows indicate transitions between adjacent items. Dashed arrows indicate transitions between non-adjacent
items separated by one. Dotted arrows indicate transitions between non-adjacent items separated by two. Each
arrow is labeled with the corresponding transitional probability.
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Peña et al. attempted to rule this hypothesis out by performing a control experiment in
which participants were tested with test items that consisted of part words of type 21 includ-
ing the internal pauses, that is, items having the form #XCi#Aj#. The relevant TPs are shown
in Fig. 2. In this case, a part word of type 21 with an internal gap (#XCi#Aj#) would be sup-
ported by generalizations 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 11 in Table 5, or by generalizations 1, 3, and 4,
were we to focus exclusively upon TPs between adjacent items. Thus, if participants were
using only TPs between adjacent items in calculating their preferences between test items,
we might expect them to prefer the part words of type 21 including the internal pauses (sup-
ported by generalizations 1, 3 and 4) over the rule words (supported by generalizations 1
and 4). Peña et al., on the contrary, report that participants still prefer rule words to part
words even when the part words are presented with internal pauses.
However, their analysis ignores non-adjacent TPs. They consider the prediction that par-
ticipants would choose rule words (#AiX¢Ci#) over part words (#CiAjX#), once we consider
‘‘probabilities over syllables, pauses, and absence of pauses in the stream and the test
items,’’ since ‘‘[t]ransitional probabilities between adjacent elements would favor rule
words over part words’’ (note 27, p. 607, emphasis added). No reason is offered as to why
only adjacent TPs should be computed. Their conclusion is based upon the assumption that
a statistical learning mechanism can only be sensitive to adjacent TPs. However, there is no
reason to believe that such mechanisms cannot be sensitive to non-adjacent regularities (see,
e.g., Gómez & Maye, 2005; Newport & Aslin, 2004). In fact, there is also a fairly clear liter-
ature demonstrating that recurrent networks can induce grammars from examples of con-
text-free and context-sensitive languages; grammars that are precisely of a form in which
there are long-distance dependencies (see, e.g., Boden & Wiles, 2000; Chalup & Blair,
2003). This is especially so given that Peña et al.’s experimental setting was precisely
designed by constructing a lexicon mainly characterized in terms of non-adjacent TPs; prob-
abilities which, as they themselves acknowledge, are the cornerstone of the segmentation
task in their Experiment 1: ‘‘[We] explore whether participants can segment a stream of
speech by means of nonadjacent transition probabilities, and we also ask whether the same
computations are used to promote the discovery of its underlying grammatical structure’’
(pp. 604–605; emphasis added).
We may then ask: which test items would participants choose if they were computing TPs
over both adjacent and non-adjacent items? As we have just seen, rule words may in princi-
ple be supported by five different generalizations (1, 4, 6, 9, and 10 in Table 5). Part words
Fig. 2. Adjacent and non-adjacent transitional probabilities for a part word of type 21 with an internal gap, that
is, an item having the form #XCi#Aj#.
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with an internal pause, on the other hand, are supported by generalizations 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and
11. However, although part words with an internal pause are supported by more generaliza-
tions than rule words, the number of generalizations with a TP of 1.0 is bigger in the case of
rule words (generalizations 4, 6, and 10 in Table 5, as opposed to generalizations 4 and 7 in
the case of part words with an internal pause). Thus, if participants are in fact computing
TPs over both adjacent and non-adjacent items, then there is no reason not to expect them to
prefer rule words over part words with an internal pause, exactly as Peña et al. report that
they do. It is not obvious that participants must be sensitive to all generalizations in virtue of
their corresponding TPs. Thus, what the current discussion shows is that the possibility that
statistics is behind it cannot be excluded in principle on the basis of an alleged statistical
inferiority on the part of rule words as opposed to part words with an internal pause.
Our point is that statistical computations based on non-adjacent TPs of the sort that are
exploited in speech segmentation may be used in order to induce existing grammatical regu-
larities in the speech stream. In order to empirically demonstrate these claims, and with an
eye to undermining one argument for the MOM hypothesis, we ran a series of connectionist
simulations that illustrate the exploitation of statistically driven information. The simula-
tions were conducted in two separate studies. In the first study, we aim to determine whether
SRNs can exhibit the patterns of preference in Table 3 when trained on a corpus that
contains subliminal gaps (Peña et al.’s Experiments 5 and 3, and Endress and Bonatti’s
Experiments 8, 3, 12, 1, 4, and 5; see Table 3). In the second study, we aim to determine
whether SRNs can exhibit the patterns of preference in Table 4 when trained on a corpus
that does not contain subliminal gaps (Peña et al.’s Experiments 1, 2, and 4, and Endress
and Bonatti’s Experiments 2 and 13; see Table 4).
3. Simulation studies
In our SRN studies, the familiarization corpus consisted of the same strings of syllables
used by Peña et al. (2002a) and Endress and Bonatti (2007). In particular, syllables were rep-
resented by pairwise orthonormal nine- or ten-dimensional binary vectors (depending on
whether segmentation gaps were included in the familiarization). The familiarization corpora
were as close as possible to those used by Endress and Bonatti while still respecting the con-
straints described by Peña et al. The specific word classes used by Peña et al. (2002a) were:
i ¼ 1 : pu . . . ki
i ¼ 2 : be . . . ga
i ¼ 3 : ta . . .du
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Thus, the A1XC1 family consists of the words puliki, puraki, and pufoki; the A2XC2
family consists of the words beliga, beraga, and befoga; and the A3XC3 family consists of
the words talidu, taradu, and tafodu. To create the 10-min familiarization stream, 100
tokens of each of the nine words in Peña et al.’s lexicon were randomly concatenated,
subject to two constraints: (a) a word of a family could not be followed by another word of
the same family; and (b) two words could not be adjacent if they had the same intermediate
syllable.
In generating our familiarization corpus, we did not use the constraint that there must be
exactly 100 words of each type. Rather, for each set of simulations, we pseudorandomly
generated 900 words according to the other constraints (see Appendix A for details and
explanation).
We created seven test corpora to investigate the predictions of Peña et al. and Endress
and Bonatti: (a) words (AiXCi); (b) part words of type 12 (CkAiX); (c) part words of type 21
(XCiAj); (d) rule words (AiX¢Ci); (e) class words (AiX¢Cj); (f) part words of type 12 that
include internal gaps of the sort considered in footnote 27 of Peña et al. (Ck#AiX); and (g)




Like Endress and Bonatti, we used an SRN (Elman, 1990). The syllables were coded as
10-bit pairwise orthonormal binary vectors (a ‘‘1-of-c’’ encoding), with the 10th bit repre-
senting a gap. We used the softmax activation function at the output layer combined with
the cross-entropy objective function (e.g., Bishop, 1995). Based on the results of preliminary
studies (reported in Laakso & Calvo, 2008), we set momentum to 0 and used 54 hidden
units. Presenting a word to the network consisted of sequentially presenting each of its three
syllables, followed by a gap. Networks had the same number of output units as input units
and were trained to predict the next syllable (or gap) from each syllable (or gap) presented
as input (more on the role of gaps below).
Trained networks were tested on five item types: training words (N = 9), part words of
type 12 (N = 18), part words of type 21 (N = 18), rule words (N = 12), and class words
(N = 12). The part words used for testing included internal gaps.
In their simulations, Endress and Bonatti considered three possibilities for representing
and training on the segmentation gaps: (a) representing the gaps with a vector of length
0, that is, as the vector <0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0>, and training the SRN to predict the
gap just as it would predict a syllable; (b) representing the gaps with a vector of length
0 and training the SRN to predict the syllable immediately after the gap; and (c) repre-
senting the gaps by an extra unit and training the SRN to predict the syllable immedi-
ately after the gap. In selecting their representational scheme, however, Endress and
Bonatti rely upon some of Peña et al. (2002a)’s data (in particular, the data Peña et al.
report in footnote 27 of their paper that they claim suggests participants’ performance
does not depend on the gap being present in the test items). Endress and Bonatti interpret
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this to mean that the best way to model participants’ representations of the test items is
by using a network that always predicts the next syllable, ignoring the gaps. In our preli-
minary work (Laakso & Calvo, 2008), we considered representing silences by an extra
symbol. Moreover, in addition to testing networks on items that either contained no gaps
or contained gaps at the beginning of test items, we also tested networks on items that
contained gaps before the A syllables (rule words and class words began with a gap, part
words of type 12 contained a gap between the first and the second syllables, and part
words of type 21 contained a gap between the second and the third syllables). As we
reported, even networks tested with gaps within part words exhibited a preference for
rule words over part words, modeling the human behavior in the control experiment
reported in footnote 27 of Peña et al. (2002a).
For the purposes of direct comparison with Endress and Bonatti’s results, however, in the
experiments reported here we tested the networks, as they did, by recording the network out-
put for the second syllable of the test items (i.e., the network’s prediction of what the third
item would be) and then comparing the network output with the actual third syllable of the
test item using the cosine similarity measure. (The cosine similarity measure has a value of
1 when two vectors point in the same direction, a value of )1 when they point in opposite
directions, and a value of 0 when they are orthogonal.) That is, the cosine similarity measure
was recorded between the third syllable of the test item and the network output activation in
response to the second syllable of the test item. We performed this procedure for all of the
test items, thereby recording network responses to all legal continuations of the first two
syllables for each test item type.
Fifty networks with different random starting weights were trained in order to simulate
individual differences. After every 10 epochs of training (each epoch consisted of a single
presentation of all 900 words in the familiarization corpus), the performance of each
network was measured and recorded. Training was stopped after 300 epochs.
3.1.2. Results
The results are shown in Fig. 3, which depicts cosine similarity values for words, part
words, rule words, and class words over the course of 300 epochs of training averaged
across our 50 network ‘‘subjects.’’ For convenience of exposition, we focus on performance
after 50, 70, 100, and 200 epochs of training, as indicated by the vertical lines in the figure.
For the same reason, we use the shorthand that the networks ‘‘prefer’’ test items of one type
to test items of another type to stand for the cumbersome expression that the mean cosine
similarity between the network outputs and the targets for the first test item type is greater
than the mean cosine similarity between the network outputs and the targets for the second
test item type.
After 50 and 70 epochs of training, the networks prefer words to rule words, rule words
to class words, and class words to part words. After 100 epochs of training, the networks
show no preference between class words and part words. After 200 epochs of training, the
networks prefer part words to class words.
Fig. 3 shows only a single line for part words (PW). Fig. 4 shows the same results except
that the data for part words of type 12 and part words of type 21 are depicted separately.
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Because the plotted values are the same for all test item types except for part words, we
























Fig. 3. Mean cosine similarity values for 50 networks trained and tested with gaps. CW, class words; PW, part

























Fig. 4. Mean cosine similarity values for 50 networks trained and tested with gaps, with part word types shown
separately. CW, class words; PW12, part words of type 12; PW21, part words of type 21; RW, rule words; W, words.
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After 50 epochs of training, the networks prefer class words to part words of either type,
showing no preference for part words of one type over the other. After 70 epochs of training,
the networks prefer class words to part words of type 12, which in turn are preferred to part
words of type 21. After 100 and 200 epochs of training, the networks prefer part words of
type 12 to class words and class words to part words of type 21. Detailed descriptive and
inferential statistics for Study 1 are presented in Appendix B.
3.1.3. Discussion
The results of our Study 1 (Fig. 3) accurately model the behavior of human partici-
pants in Peña et al.’s Experiments 5 and 3, and Endress and Bonatti’s Experiments 8, 3,
12, 1, 4, and 5; see Table 3. Specifically, the results by Peña et al. and Endress and
Bonatti on segmented 2-min familiarization streams (Experiments 5, 8, 3, and 12 in
Table 3) indicate preferences for words over rule words, for rule words over class
words, and for class words over part words (compare network performance in Fig. 3
after 50 epochs of training). Their results on segmented 10-min familiarization streams
(Experiments 3 and 1 in Table 3) indicate preferences for class words and rule words
over part words (compare network performance in Fig. 3 after 70 epochs of training).
Their results on segmented 30-min familiarization streams (Experiment 4 in Table 3)
indicate no preference between class words and part words (compare network per-
formance in Fig. 3 after 100 epochs of training). Finally, their results on segmented
60-min familiarization streams (Experiment 5 in Table 3) indicate preference for part
words over class words (compare network performance in Fig. 3 after 200 epochs of
training).
It is important to point out that the divergence between the part word types in Fig. 4 is
different from some behavioral results that Endress and Bonatti briefly report. As Fig. 4
shows, part words of type 12 and part words of type 21 fare differently with respect to
class words in our simulations. Part words of type 12 (as shown in Fig. 4) show the same
qualitative pattern as the average of all part words (as shown in Fig. 3). That is, they are
dispreferred to class words after fewer epochs of training but preferred to class words after
more epochs of training. However, part words of type 21 (as shown in Fig. 4) do not show
the same qualitative pattern as the average of all part words (as shown in Fig. 3). In partic-
ular, our networks never prefer part words of type 21 to class words. Having observed a
similar divergence in one of their network simulations, Endress and Bonatti wrote that
‘‘the network predicts a difference between how part-words of type 12 and type 21 will
stand the comparison with class-words; yet, in none of our experiments have we observed
it’’ (pp. 282–3).
Does this difference between the way that the networks perform and the behavioral data
undermine our argument against the MOM hypothesis? We think not, for three reasons: (a)
the human behavioral data are incomplete; (b) there could be several reasons for the differ-
ence between the network simulations and the human data, none of which are relevant to
our main thesis; and (c) the very question whether the behavioral data and the simulated
data match in this case is irrelevant to our thesis to begin with. In the following paragraphs,
we address these reasons in turn.
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First, the human behavioral data are incomplete. Endress and Bonatti write that they have
not observed such a difference in their experiments, but they do not report the relevant data
in detail. For one thing, although they report the standard deviation for participants’ prefer-
ence for class words, they do not report standard deviation for participants’ preference for
part words, whether combined or separate. (We explain in the next paragraph why this is
important.) For another, none of the comparisons that Endress and Bonatti (2007) report is a
direct comparison between part words of type 12 and part words of type 21. Instead, they
report comparisons between part words of each type and class words. Thus, with regard to
their Experiments 1–3 and 9–10, Endress and Bonatti report that there ‘‘was no difference
between the part-word types against which the class-words were tested’’ (pp. 255, 256, 258,
269, 273). The assumption that part words of different types are indistinguishable is an
inference from the experimental comparison between part words and class words to a pre-
diction about the status of part word types; an inference whose validity we question. A suffi-
ciently powerful test of the hypothesis that participants will respond differently to part
words of different types is therefore needed. The appropriate experiment to test the hypothe-
sis would compare part words of type 12 and part words of type 21 directly by forcing
participants to choose between them at test. Our model suggests that participants might
reliably prefer one of the part word types to the other, and that the preference might reverse
after extended familiarization.
The second reason that the difference between the way that the networks perform on part
words versus class words and the behavioral data does undermine our argument against the
MOM hypothesis is that there could be several reasons for the difference between the net-
work simulations and the human data, none of which would impugn our argument against
MOM. One possibility is that the behavioral experiments simply did not have the statistical
power to detect the small differences that actually do exist. Because Endress and Bonatti do
not report the variance in preferences for the respective part word types, we do not know
whether their failure to find a difference in part word types is merely due to lacking the sta-
tistical power that would be necessary to detect such differences. The amount of variance in
the human data generally is quite high (presumably due to a plethora of irrelevant perfor-
mance factors) compared to the amount of variance in the network data (because the net-
works are much simpler mechanisms than human beings), and the number of participants
that Endress and Bonatti used in their human experiments (approximately 20 for each exper-
iment) is fewer than the number of network participants that we trained (50).
Another possible reason that the network simulations may appear different from the
human data in this respect is that the human preference structure may be non-metric. Human
similarity judgments in many domains are non-metric (e.g., Tversky, 1977), but standard
SRNs—whose representational mechanisms are fundamentally Euclidean—cannot exhibit
non-metric preference structures. Admittedly, this points to one way in which the SRN sim-
ulations may fail to accurately model all of the human data. However, we must remember
that the goal here is to model just the set of behavioral experiments that have been presented
as evidence for the MOM hypothesis, in order to demonstrate that in principle a single
statistical mechanism can account for the data, not to present a psychologically realistic
model of human artificial language learning.
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Yet another possible reason for the divergence observed between the two types of part
words is the particular representational scheme that Endress and Bonatti chose to model par-
ticipants’ representations of the test items, which we copied for the purposes of direct com-
parison with Endress and Bonatti’s results. Fig. 1b,c above, where adjacent and non-
adjacent TPs for a part word of type 12 and a part word of type 21 were shown, may hint at
the reason for the divergence between the patterns of part words of different types in Fig. 4.
In the case of part words of type 12, the TP between the second and the third syllable is 0.33
(Fig. 1b). By contrast, the TP between the second and the third syllable in the case of part
words of type 21 is 0 (Fig. 1c). Fig. 4 records the cosine similarity measure between the
third syllable of the test item and the network output activation in response to the second
syllable of the test item.
Having said all this, the third reason that the difference between the way that the
networks perform on part words versus class words and the behavioral data does not
undermine our argument against the MOM hypothesis is that the difference is irrele-
vant to the question at hand. As we noted in the introduction, our goal is to model
the negative correlation between performance on abstract items and familiarization
duration that Endress et al. have taken as evidence for the MOM hypothesis (i.e., the
primary data listed in Tables 3 and 4). We have not claimed to offer a psychologi-
cally realistic model of every aspect of the human data. Therefore, the fact that there
are minor discrepancies between the network performance and the human behavioral
performance on an incidental measurement (part words of different types vs. class
words) is tangential. It does not undermine our point that the networks model the
most important effects in the human behavioral data, the ones that have been taken
as the primary evidence for the MOM hypothesis.
Nevertheless, in addition to modeling the behavior of human participants in Peña
et al.’s and Endress and Bonatti’s experiments, our simulations reveal something impor-
tant about the preference for class words. As Figs. 3 and 4 show, class rules do not
appear to have been learned in the first place.
Endress and Bonatti interpret human participants’ preference for class words over part
words after 2 min and 10 min of familiarization as evidence that the participants have
learned a class rule. Endress and Bonatti conjecture that when confronted with a segmented
familiarization stream, participants may be freed from the burden of having to parse the
input to extract first the constituents, as in the case of a continuous stream. In this way, they
are able to focus from the start upon the underlying structure itself. With longer familiariza-
tion, generalization is overwhelmed as participants have more time to track the statistical
relations that obtain between items in the input stream. The interpretation of Endress and
Bonatti is thus that an initially induced dependency that takes place between classes of items
degrades with familiarization duration. But Fig. 3 makes it clear that another interpretation
of these results is possible: Perhaps the discovery of structural regularities is only apparent
and people are not learning a class rule at all but only ruling it out rather slowly. That is
what our networks seem to be doing—although the networks disprefer part words right from
the beginning, it takes them some time (approximately 100 epochs—see Fig. 3) to learn that
class words are no better.
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Now why would participants be slower to develop a dispreference for class words than to
show a dispreference for part words? Fig. 5 shows adjacent and non-adjacent TPs for a class
word having the form #AiX¢Cj#. Note that, whereas class words can in principle be sup-
ported by two different generalizations among adjacent items (generalizations 1 and 4 in
Table 5), and by two other generalizations among non-adjacent items (generalizations 9 and
10 in Table 5), part words of type 12 (#CiAjX#), and of type 21 (#XCiAj#), are only sup-
ported by one generalization among adjacent items (generalizations 2 and 3 in Table 5,
respectively), and by none among non-adjacent items. An associative explanation may thus
underlie the diverging time spans of dispreference between class words and part words
shown in Fig. 3. We suggest that much the same might underlie human participants’ perfor-
mance in Endress and Bonatti’s experiments. That is, people may be ruling out an unlearned
class rule rather slowly. In fact, taking into account that the non-adjacent TP between the
first and the third syllable is lost in the case of class words, it is difficult to grasp how partic-
ipants might possess such powerful generalization machinery that is triggered when released
from having to parse the corpus, as Endress and Bonatti suggest. More recently, Endress
and Mehler (2009) have questioned the induction of classes. Instead, they now favor an
edge-based mechanism that tracks the positional information of syllables in beginning and
end position. Insofar as such an edge-based mechanism is non-statistical, the evidence they
report still supports the MOM hypothesis (we address this other possibility in the general
discussion).
A final caveat is in order. One might question the sense in which epochs of training in
artificial neural networks and familiarization duration with human participants relate to each
other (recall that network performance was probed every 10 epochs, and connection weights
frozen after 300 epochs). Indeed, it is not clear that there must be a linear relation between
epochs of training and familiarization duration. Our key point is that the networks do repro-
duce the initial patterns of preference, and that such a preference does reverse in subsequent
epoch intervals as a result of an increased learning of the prediction task. The MOM hypoth-
esis capitalizes on an observed negative correlation between the extraction of structural reg-
ularities and familiarization duration. The longer the duration of the continuous
familiarization stream, the stronger the preference for part words over rule words. On the
contrary, a very short familiarization with a segmented stream allows for the induction of
Fig. 5. Adjacent and non-adjacent transitional probabilities for a class word having the form #AiX¢Cj#. Solid
arrows indicate transitions between adjacent items. Dashed arrows indicate transitions between non-adjacent
items separated by one. Dotted arrows indicate transitions between non-adjacent items separated by two. Each
arrow is labeled with the corresponding transitional probability.
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the rule (preference of class and rule words). Thus, Endress and Bonatti predict that a prefer-
ence for class words will decrease over longer familiarization durations. Demonstrating that,
with sufficient training, networks can also show a reversal (coming to prefer part words over
class words) is thus critical to the debate. Such a reversal is exactly what we find in Study 1.
The MOM hypothesis ignores the possibility that subliminal segmentation gaps can be
exploited statistically, as the present results with SRNs illustrate.
3.2. Study 2
The previous simulation used training data matching the familiarization stimuli used in
Peña et al.’s Experiments 3 and 5, and Endress and Bonatti’s Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, and
12 (Table 3). However, an important aspect of Peña et al.’s and Endress and Bonatti’s
results is the fact that their experiments show that participants cannot learn the so-called
abstract rules without the segmentation gaps. How then do our SRNs fare when trained on a
familiarization corpus that does not include the gaps (Table 4)? The results obtained by
Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti’s on continuous 10-min familiarization streams (the first
four experiments in Table 4) indicate preference for words over part words, no preference
between rule ⁄ class words and part words, and preference for rule words over class words.
Finally, Peña et al.’s results on continuous 30-min familiarization streams (Experiment 4 in
Table 4) indicate preference for part words over rule words. Study 2 attempts to model the
pattern of performance in Table 4.
3.2.1. Method
Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except that the networks were trained and tested without
gaps. Thus, the syllables were coded as nine-bit pairwise orthonormal binary vectors. As
previously, the networks used the softmax activation function at the output layer, the cross-
entropy objective function, momentum of 0 and 54 hidden units.
Presenting a word to the network consisted of sequentially presenting each of its three
syllables. Networks had the same number of output units as input units and were trained to
predict the next syllable from each syllable presented as input. The testing procedures were
the same as in Study 1, except that the test items did not contain gaps. As in Study 1, 50 net-
works were trained in order to simulate individual differences. After every 10 epochs of
training, the performance of each network was measured and recorded. Training was
stopped after 300 epochs.
3.2.2. Results
The results are shown in Fig. 6, which depicts cosine similarity values for words, part
words, rule words, and class words over the course of 300 epochs of training averaged
across our 50 network ‘‘subjects.’’ For convenience of exposition, we focus on performance
after 50 and 200 epochs of training, as indicated by the vertical lines in the figure. For the
same reason, we again use the shorthand that the networks ‘‘prefer’’ test items of one type
to test items of another type to stand for the cumbersome expression that the mean cosine
similarity between the network outputs and the targets for the first test item type is greater
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than the mean cosine similarity between the network outputs and the targets for the second
test item type.
After 50 epochs of training, the networks prefer words to part words. In addition, they are
indifferent to the choice between part words and rule words. Finally, they prefer rule words
to class words. After 200 epochs, the networks prefer part words to rule words.
Fig. 7 shows the same results with part words of type 12 and part words of type 21
drawn separately. After 50 and 200 epochs of training, the networks exhibit a slight
preference for part words of type 12 to part words of type 21 and for part words of type
21 to rule words. Detailed descriptive and inferential statistics for Study 2 are presented
in Appendix C.
3.2.3. Discussion
The results shown in Fig. 6 match the experimental results in Table 4 with one exception:
Although Endress and Bonatti found that human participants had no preference between
class words and part words after 10 min of familiarization with a continuous stream (their
Experiment 2—see Table 4 above), our networks prefer part words over class words
throughout the course of training on inputs without gaps (Fig. 6). We must remember, how-
ever, the rationale of Endress and Bonatti’s Experiment 2 in the context of testing the MOM
hypothesis. Their concern was with whether participants could learn a class rule. They took
the results of their Experiment 1 (showing a preference for class words over part words after
10 min of familiarization on a segmented stream—see Table 3 above) to show that partici-
pants could learn a class rule after familiarization with a stream containing segmentation






















Fig. 6. Mean cosine similarity ratings for 50 networks trained and tested without gaps. CW, class words; PW,
part words; RW, rule words; W, words.
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between class words and part words after 10 min of familiarization on a continuous
stream—see Table 4 above) to show that participants could not learn a class rule after famil-
iarization with a stream not containing segmentation cues. Based on our network modeling
results, however, we have suggested that participants may not be learning a class rule even
when the familiarization stream contains segmentation cues. Rather, participants may sim-
ply be slower to develop a dispreference for class words than they are to develop a disprefer-
ence for part words. (See Fig. 3 and the discussion in the results section of Study 1 above.)
The same point applies to streams not containing segmentation cues as to streams that do
contain segmentation cues: Networks rapidly develop a dispreference for class words (com-
pare the lines for class words in Figs. 3 and 6), and we suggest that human participants may
be doing the same. Fig. 8 shows adjacent and non-adjacent TPs for a class word without
surrounding gaps, that is, a word having the form AiX¢Cj. Note that all of the TPs are 0. It is























Fig. 7. Mean cosine similarity ratings for 50 networks trained and tested without gaps, with part word types
shown separately. CW, class words; PW12, part words of type 12; PW21, part words of type 21; RW, rule
words; W, words
Fig. 8. Adjacent and non-adjacent transitional probabilities for a class word without surrounding gaps, that is,
having the form AiX¢Cj. Solid arrows indicate transitions between adjacent items. The dashed arrow indicates
the transition between non-adjacent items separated by one. Each arrow is labeled with the corresponding transi-
tional probability.
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We therefore take the following lessons from the stimulations: (a) segmented inputs
lead statistical learners to find both words and rule words familiar while finding class
words and part words unfamiliar; and (b) unsegmented inputs lead statistical learners to
find words familiar while finding rule words, part words, and class words unfamiliar.
Other differences (i.e., the differences between part words, rule words, and class words
in Fig. 6) may simply be uninteresting for participants as they are all ‘‘below threshold’’
for familiarity. Thus, the negative correlation between duration of familiarization and
generalization of a class rule that is exhibited in the human experiments may be a red
herring—rather than providing strong evidence for the existence of two different learn-
ing mechanisms, it may simply reflect overlearning of certain statistical patterns that are
in any case irrelevant to the projection of a rule. Note how low the cosine similarity
values are for part words and for class words after about 50 epochs of training in
Fig. 6.
In summary, the experiments in Table 4 complement those of Table 3 insofar as no
generalization obtains when the familiarization stream contains no gaps. The modeling
results in Study 1 would be less significant were we to fail to model statistically the fact
that no induction of rules obtains without the segmentation gaps. Studies 1 and 2
accurately, we conclude, model the experimental results that are relevant to the MOM
hypothesis.
4. General discussion
Non-adjacent dependencies are an important test of any purported account of language
acquisition based on statistical learning because they are pervasive in language, but it is not
obvious how a statistical learning mechanism could acquire them. The negative correlation
between performance on abstract items and familiarization duration (Tables 3 and 4) has
been taken to underpin the MOM hypothesis. Initial preference for class words over part
words is taken as evidence that the participants have learned a class rule. Endress and
Bonatti’s reasoning was that familiarization with a segmented stream allows participants to
focus upon the extraction of the underlying structure from the start. However, with further
familiarization, participants can track the existing statistical relations between stream
chunks. Thus, according to Endress and Bonatti, an initially induced dependency between
classes of items degrades with familiarization duration as it becomes overwhelmed by pro-
cessing dependencies among speech elements. In this way, according to the MOM hypothe-
sis, although an associative mechanism suffices to segment speech, structural generalization
requires a rule-following mechanism. Both an associative and a non-associative mechanism
are thus needed to analyze speech.
In this section we (a) compare our analysis vis-à-vis others; (b) discuss the source
of the discrepancies between the work of Endress and Bonatti and ours; (c) address
issues of implementation; (d) assess further evidential basis on behalf of MOM hypothe-
ses; and close up by (e) considering the distinction between types and tokens of
mechanisms.
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4.1. Our analysis vis-à-vis others
We are not the first to have criticized the MOM framework. Previous criticisms that call
into question the dual-mechanism account that underpins the MOM framework of Endress
and Bonatti (2007) have been raised by Newport and Aslin (2004), Onnis, Monaghan, Rich-
mond, and Chater (2005), Perruchet, Tyler, Galland, and Peereman (2004) and Perruchet,
Peereman, and Tyler (2006), among others. So how does our analysis differ from these other
criticisms?
Newport and Aslin (2004) and Onnis et al. (2005) explored the possibility of learning
non-adjacent dependencies experimentally and via modeling, respectively. In particular,
their work exploited the possibility of phonological ⁄ phonotactic confounds by focusing on
previous linguistic knowledge of the subjects. The patterns of preference observed in
Endress and Bonatti’s experiments might be due to a match between statistical features of
the artificial stream and the statistical distribution of words of their native language.
Although it is possible that previously acquired knowledge helps explain the behavior of
subjects in non-ecological experimental settings (it has been modeled for instance in the
‘‘rule learning by infants’’ debate by Seidenberg and Elman [1999a] in response to Marcus
et al. [1999]), our simulations target different aspects of Peña et al. and Endress and Bonat-
ti’s results. We exploit the structure of the corpora themselves, a structure that contains, as
we have argued, sufficient information, once subliminal segmentation gaps are included.
The inclusion of silences being crucial in Peña et al. (2002a) and Endress and Bonatti
(2007), we reasoned that it may be possible to track TPs not only among syllables but also
among syllables and silences, regardless of the possibility of phonological ⁄ phonotactic con-
founds, and regardless of the possibility that previous cognitive pre-shaping (or, for that
matter, any other source of information external to the experimental settings themselves)
underpin the behavioral responses reported by Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti.
Other replies, such as Perruchet et al. (2004, 2006), pinpointed ‘‘deep methodological
inadequacies.’’ Courtesy of PARSER (Perruchet & Vinter, 1998), a model that generates
streams exclusively based upon adjacent elements, Perruchet and colleagues targeted the
possibility that participants may be tuning to parts of the stimuli (Ai or Ci) instead of gener-
alizing the Ai_Ci rule itself (although see Bonatti et al., 2006, for a rejoinder). We need not
repeat their exchanges here, but suffice it to say for present purposes that more recent work
by Perruchet and Tillmann (2010) appears to confirm the view that the general-purpose
learning principles underpinning PARSER may account for structural rule learning in artifi-
cial grammars. Perruchet and Tillmann (2010) argue that connectionist networks may also
be able to account for the data they report, but at the expense of (ad hoc) sophistication. This
claim goes beyond the present proposal, but despite the differences, the objective of this
work is not to compare PARSER with connectionist networks, but rather to explore the
possibilities of associative mechanisms, ultimately, a shared agenda.
With all that being said, Endress and Bonatti designed control experiments to deal with
these and other concerns, one by one. Thus, for example, their Experiments 6 and 7 were
designed to control whether participants considered either the initial or the final syllable to
induce the rule, instead of both, and their Experiments 10 and 11 to discount the possibility
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of phonological confounds in their Experiments 1 and 2. On the other hand, their Experi-
ment 9, where class words and part words are both surrounded by pure tones during test,
was designed to test whether a single mechanism could exploit TPs over both syllables and
gaps. We are puzzled about what pure tones, rather than silences, are supposed to represent
in Experiment 9. Endress and Bonatti (2007) claim: ‘‘Because this manipulation obliterates
TPs to and from silences surrounding test items, silences cannot play any crucial role to
account for participants’ preference for class-words found in Experiments 1 and 3. Experi-
ment 9 demonstrates that associationist computations over syllables and silences alike
cannot account for the preference for class-words’’ (p. 270). We could have run simulations
where pure tones surrounding test items were represented by activation of an untrained input
unit, but we fail to see what the point would have been. After all, whether the bracket
between test words be 25 ms silences (Endress and Bonatti, 2007), 1 s silences (Endress &
Mehler, 2009; see below), pure tones, or whatever else someone might come up with, it does
not change the sort of regularities involved within the test items. No such manipulation
demonstrates that a mechanism that learns those regularities cannot be associative. Human
participants may well automatically ignore the surrounding pure tones during test as non-
linguistic material, much as they must ignore any ‘‘surrounding’’ silences during test, since
they are indistinguishable from silence before and after presentation of the test word. That
is, when a human being performs a two alternative forced choice task with auditory stimuli,
any stimuli that are ‘‘preceded by silence’’ are indistinguishable from those that are not
(because, in such a task, all stimuli are preceded and followed by some silence anyway).
Once having controlled for, and discarded one by one, the alternatives proposed against
the MOM hypothesis, Endress and Bonatti turned to connectionist simulations with SRNs.
The idea was to demonstrate that there was no possibility for associative language learning,
assuming that SRNs were, computationally speaking, representative of the associative
mechanisms that may underlie language acquisition in humans.
4.2. The source of the discrepancies
In this article, we have taken up the challenge put forward by Endress and Bonatti and
reported the results of a series of simulations, based on a single connectionist model, that
accounts for the negative correlation observed in their earlier work. We attribute the diver-
gence between our modeling work and theirs to three factors: (i) our familiarization corpora
were generated in a superior fashion; (ii) we used different activation and objective func-
tions; and (iii) our networks have more hidden units. We explain (i)–(iii) in turn.
First, Endress and Bonatti generated familiarization streams that ‘‘contained 100
repetitions of each word, yielding 900 words in total’’ (p. 279). However, as we explain in
Appendix A, this is likely to have resulted in a biased familiarization corpus. To conform to
Peña et al.’s original design, the familiarization stream must obey the following constraints:
(a) a word of a given family cannot be followed by another word of the same family; and
(b) two words that have the same intermediate syllable cannot be in adjacent position. So,
for instance, puliki and puraki, and puliki and beliga, cannot be followed by each other on
pain of violating constraints (a) and (b), respectively. However, if the corpus is built by first
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taking 100 tokens of each word and then pseudorandomly concatenating them according to
the constraints (a) and (b), it is very likely that a significant number of words near the end
will be repetitions. (See Appendix A for the details and for additional causes of concern.)
Thus, unlike Endress and Bonatti, we generated a familiarization corpus of 900 words
selected pseudorandomly subject to the constaints (a) and (b), without being subject to the
constraint that there should be exactly 100 tokens of each word. This procedure ensures that
the familiarization stream does not end with a highly repetitive series of items.
The second difference between our simulations and those of Endress and Bonatti is in
the activation and objective functions used in the neural network models. Endress and
Bonatti do not report the activation functions or objective function used in their simula-
tions. Given, nonetheless, their employment of standard, Elman-type, SRNs, we inferred
that they used the logistic activation function, and an anonymous reviewer confirmed this
guess. However, our simulations do not fall neatly within the standard sort of modeling that
Endress and Bonatti appear to have in mind. (Endress and Bonatti consider work on SRNs
by Altmann (2002), Christiansen and Curtin (1999), and Rodriguez (2001), versions that do
not substantially depart from Elman’s original model). There is a well-known issue with
Endress and Bonatti’s common choice (using sigmoid output units and the sum-squared
error function) to train networks on problems where the target patterns are mostly zeros, as
they are here. Such networks easily find a local minimum of the sum-squared error function
by adjusting weights so that all output unit activations are close to zero. Moreover, because
the delta term used in backpropagating sum-squared error involves a multiplication by the
derivative of the activation function (the ‘‘sigma prime term’’), training slows down dra-
matically whenever the output approaches 0 or 1, regardless of the target value (because
the derivative of the sigmoid approaches 0 in both cases). The preferred procedure for prob-
lems using a 1-of-c encoding is to use the softmax activation function at the output units
combined with the cross-entropy objective function (e.g., Bishop, 1995). The softmax acti-
vation function causes the activations of the output units to always sum to unity, which is
correct in the case of a 1-of-c encoding (a side effect is that one may treat output activations
as the network’s subjective assessments of the probability that each output unit codes for
the right category on a given input pattern). In addition, using the cross-entropy objective
function causes the sigma prime term to drop out of the calculation of delta values, ensuring
that weight updates approach zero only as the activation value approaches the target value.
Thus, in our simulations, we used the softmax activation function and the cross-entropy
objective function.
The third difference between our simulations and those of Endress and Bonatti is the
number of hidden units in the networks. On the basis of pilot studies (Laakso & Calvo,
2008), we determined that learning the familiarization stream worked best when networks
had 54 hidden units. Thus, whereas the networks used by Endress and Bonatti had either 5
or 27 hidden units, hidden space in our case consists of 54 dimensions. Although hidden
dimensionality was not an issue in their opinion (they report similar results on networks with
5 and 27 hidden units), this may simply be because their networks did not have enough hid-
den units to perform the task. Our model has more representational resources in hidden unit
space due to our doubling the maximum number of dimensions they used.
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In sum, in the light of our results it is clear that an argument is needed to defend Endress
and Bonatti’s claim that their ‘‘results transcend [their] particular model, and that other
associationist mechanisms will behave like SRNs with respect to our experiments.’’ (p.
279). In fact, although we believe that our ability to simulate the data is due to a combina-
tion of (i)–(iii) above, determining the precise source of the discrepancies is secondary. The
reason is that Endress and Bonatti’s argument for the MOM hypothesis rests upon the asser-
tion that no merely statistical mechanism can account for the empirical data (‘‘we conclude
that a single-mechanism hypothesis, as implemented by a SRN or any associative device
that extracts co-occurrences among items in the stream, is not adequate to explain our
data,’’ p. 285; emphasis added); the MOM hypothesis thus depends upon a universal non-
existence claim. Our response has been to present one case of an associative device in which
a merely statistical mechanism does account for the known empirical data; that is, we have
presented an existence proof.
4.3. Issues of implementation
It is fair to say that concluding that algebraic manipulations do not take place based on
the simple fact that a neural network accounts for the data is a non sequitur. The hidden pre-
mise that delivers the goods is that neural networks do not implement abstract relationships
between variables in an explicit manner. Marcus (2001), for instance, has pursued this line
of reasoning in the case of the so-called great past tense debate (Pinker & Ullman, 2002;
Ramscar, 2002) and the debate over rule learning in infants, and concluded that only
connectionist models that explicitly implement abstract relationships between variables
can account for both the past tense and infant results. We need to know then which architec-
tural features are behind our network’s successful modeling of the experimental results of
Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti. If the required features include, for instance, the instan-
tiation of variables, then a connectionist model of speech generalization will serve to back
up the MOM hypothesis (by implementing abstract variables). We may put this somewhat
differently: To warrant their claim that the MOM hypothesis is the only explanation for the
data, Endress and Bonatti need to show that only connectionist networks that implement
explicit rules in the form of abstract relationships between variables can account for their
results.
The question then is: Which models implement rules? A clear case of implementation
occurs when nodes in the architecture are used as variables. This is not the case with our
SRNs, where the ‘‘1-of-c’’ encoding is used to represent the actual syllables that form the
‘‘training’’ words in familiarization (pu or ki), and not to represent word positional slots (Ai
or Ci). Someone may argue that a different form of implementation takes place when an
SRN is trained on a categorization task, where the teaching pattern for gradient descent
learning is provided externally. Marcus (2001), for example, argues that the SRNs of
Seidenberg and Elman (1999a) fall in this implementational category. As in the case of the
encoding of variables, the argument would run, a rule is implemented in the non-ecological
calculation of delta values in the form of a trainer that marks the output categories explic-
itly. In our simulations, however, the cross-entropy objective function deployed in a
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self-supervised prediction task calculates delta values in an ecological, non-implementational
manner. That is, no output categories are fed externally to the network as targets, because
the target is the next input to the SRN, an input that stands for actual syllables and not
variable slots.
There may be other ways in which the modeling results of an implementational connec-
tionist network would support the MOM hypotheses. But it is noteworthy that Endress and
Bonatti’s failed attempt to model their own experimental results was carried out with SRNs.
We may thus assume that their effort was directed toward a form of connectionism that they
considered non-implementational. Because the only architectural difference between their
model and ours is the employment of the softmax activation function at the output units
combined with the cross-entropy objective function in an otherwise standard Elman net, we
take it that they would agree that we have built a connectionist model that accounts for the
negative correlation observed without implementing abstract relationships between variables
in doing so.
4.4. Further evidential basis
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between positive evidence that supports the claim
that algebraic mechanisms are fast and negative ‘‘evidence’’ that would support the same
claim somewhat more indirectly. As Seidenberg et al. (2002) put it in response to Peña et al.
(2002a), ‘‘The evidence for rule learning is mostly negative: cases where learning occurs
but there is no obvious statistical explanation. A theory explaining how rule learners arrive
at exactly the correct generalizations given the complexities of their experience would rep-
resent substantial progress’’ (p. 554). Allowing for the statistical generalization of rule
words and the slower development of a dispreference for class words, together with the
reversal of behavior we have modeled, we would like to see an explicit presentation of the
nuts-and-bolts of a complex mechanism that would make it a more attractive alternative
than our very simple model.
Interestingly enough, although Endress and Bonatti (2007) try to make progress by char-
acterizing the operations that may underlie the negative correlation they observed,1 in a
more recent paper, Endress and Mehler (2009) themselves question the very possibility of
class-learning in artificial grammars (see, e.g., Gerken, Wilson, & Lewis, 2005; Monaghan,
Chater, & Christiansen, 2005; Redington et al., 1998). They argue instead in favor of an
edge-based mechanism that tracks when the Ai and Ci elements are in the beginning and
end positions. Someone might contend that, considering the way in which Endress and Meh-
ler (2009) reinterpret Peña et al. (2002a) and Endress and Bonatti (2007), the work reported
here becomes somewhat obsolete. However, although Endress and Mehler now agree that
there is no class-learning as such, the new experimental evidence they report still serves, in
their view, to back up the MOM hypothesis. Because the partial modifications that Endress
& Mehler incorporate still serve to advocate a MOM view, our working hypothesis does
bear directly upon their re-interpretation.
Briefly, Endress and Mehler (2009) designed a set of experiments aimed at assessing
whether learning the positional information of Ai and Ci elements might account for Endress
A. Laakso, P. Calvo ⁄ Cognitive Science 35 (2011) 1271
and Bonatti’s so-called class-learning in terms of an edge-based, non-statistical, mechanism.
Their experiments are based on the same method as that used by Peña et al., and Endress
and Bonatti, except that participants listen to sequences of pentasyllabic, instead of trisyl-
labic, artificial words. The idea, inspired by the sequential memory literature (e.g., Henson,
1998), is to test whether participants can generalize irrespective of the position of the Ai and
Ci syllables (edge or middle position) as opposed to being able to generalize only when the
Ai and Ci syllables are in edge position. Thus, under two experimental conditions, words
can have the form AiXYZCi (edge condition), or the form XAiYCiZ (middle condition),
respectively. If participants generalize exclusively after familiarization with edge-condition
words, that may count as evidence for an edge-based mechanism. By contrast, Endress and
Mehler reason, were participants to generalize after familiarization with both edge- and mid-
dle-condition words, that would count as evidence against an edge-based mechanism and in
favor of some form of full-fledged class-learning ability that develops irrespective of edge-
saliency, as in the mastery of the noun and verb categories of natural languages, which can
be acquired regardless of their position.
Congenial with the results of Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti with trisyllabic words,
the results that Endress and Mehler report with pentasyllabic words are that participants fail
to generalize after familiarization with a continuous stream under both conditions (edge and
middle). However, they also fail to generalize after familiarization with a subliminally seg-
mented stream (25 ms), under both conditions (edge and middle). But, finally, participants
are able to generalize after familiarization with a non-subliminally segmented stream (1 s),
although, crucially, only when the Ai and Ci syllables occur in edge position (AiXYZCi).
That is, participants still fail to generalize when the Ai and Ci syllables occur in middle posi-
tion (XAiYCiZ). These results, taken together, drive Endress and Mehler to suggest that
participants are able to generalize courtesy of a non-statistical mechanism that operates by
encoding the position of syllables in beginning and end position.
In our view, the results of Endress and Mehler can easily be accommodated within the
general framework herewith advocated. Bluntly, why do we need a specialized edge-based
mechanism to encode the positions of Ai and Ci syllables once positional cues (edges) are
available? As we have seen before, a simpler explanation is available: a statistical mecha-
nism that tracks TPs not only among syllables but also among syllables and silences. That
is, instead of positing the existence of an edge-based mechanism, and a statistical mecha-
nism that tracks TPs among syllables, the results reported in this article with trisyllabic
words suggest that a single statistical mechanism may well be capable of tracking the differ-
ent co-occurrence statistics in the edge and middle conditions with pentasyllabic words as
well.
Moreover, it is important to highlight that the controversial subliminal character of the
pauses used by Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti are no longer an issue in the case of
Endress and Mehler (2009). Participants fail to generalize with 25 ms gaps and are only able
to do so when 1 s long segmentation pauses are inserted. In our view, then, there is no rea-
son to exclude the possibility that such strongly marked co-occurrences cannot be tracked
statistically, when we have seen that participants can do so even on subliminally segmented
trisyllabic words. Based on our network modeling results, we have suggested that
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participants may not be learning a class rule after all, even when the familiarization stream
contains segmentation cues. Rather, participants may simply be slower to develop a dispre-
ference for class words than they are to show a dispreference for part words. These results
are directly applicable to pentasyllabic words: Time to develop a dispreference for CWs in
edge and middle conditions may vary because of the differing weight of the TPs between
silences and Ai and Ci syllables. A fast associative mechanism may thus account not only
for Endress and Bonatti’s results but also for Endress and Mehler’s experiments with penta-
syllabic words. Nevertheless, whether generalization on the new corpora could be accounted
for by a single statistical mechanism, as we have shown for trisyllabic words, or by more
than one statistical mechanism, remains a question for future research.
4.5. Types and tokens of mechanisms
Finally, it remains an issue whether statistical mechanisms cannot be fast. Perruchet et al.
(2004) make a similar point when they note that: ‘‘The assertion that associative learning
proceeds slowly does not stand up to empirical observations. For example, some associative
forms of learning have been shown to develop over one trial or so’’ (p. 582). As discussed
above, the defender of the MOM hypothesis needs to show that only connectionist networks
that explicitly implement abstract relationships between variables can account for the
Endress and Bonatti results. Presumably, the argument would be that the quick extraction of
generalizations can be achieved only by a mechanism that implements abstract relationships
between variables. However, we need not even try to qualify the claim that statistical mech-
anisms are necessarily slow. As Bonatti et al. (2006) acknowledge: ‘‘We never denied that
a theory based on statistical learning might account for fast learning.’’ But they continue,
‘‘however, the thesis that all learning can be explained by statistical computations is empty
unless our critics can propose a single mechanism that is capable of simultaneously explain-
ing (a) segmentation of words after exposure to a long familiarization (but not to a short
familiarization) with a continuous stream; (b) extraction of structural information after a
short familiarization with a discontinuous stream; and (c) failure to extract the same infor-
mation after familiarization with any continuous stream’’ (p. 319; emphasis added).
Now, granting that statistical learning may underlie fast learning, we can see that the
challenge of Bonatti et al. (2006) is unjustified. The challenge resides not in accounting for
(a)–(c) statistically, but rather in accounting for (a)–(c) simultaneously by means of a single
mechanism. But they seem to be conflating types of mechanisms with specific mechanisms
as tokens. In connectionist jargon, the challenge is then to obtain a single weight matrix
through error-driven training such that all the knowledge that gets induced is fully distrib-
uted and superposed in the matrix. But why could not separate or partially overlapping sta-
tistical mechanisms be responsible for (a), (b), and (c)? Why, in short, is a single weight
matrix needed where all knowledge is fully superposed? This rendering of the situation
amounts to raising the challenge in terms of a single (token) mechanism. Bonatti et al.
(2006) do not complain after all about the speed of one kind of learning over another, but
rather about the number of token mechanisms that can play a role. The MOM hypothesis
entails ‘‘more than one type of mechanism,’’ but nothing in their argument tells against the
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possibility that more than one associative mechanism is in place. In short, someone may
even wish to stick to the label ‘‘MOM’’ and defend on empirical grounds the existence of
‘‘more than one (statistical) mechanism,’’ such that none of the statistical mechanisms
involved implements abstract relationships between variables. With that being said, the
modeling results reported here account for the data in a non-implementational manner while
meeting the added challenge of accounting for (a)–(c) above in one single weight matrix.
Overall, our results and discussion show that the MOM hypothesis is a less parsimonious
explanation than a single type of mechanism (associative learning) hypothesis. Our model,
we contend, meets this challenge: It explains the phenomena that Peña et al. and Endress
and Bonatti report, and it is more parsimonious than their alternative. The single-mechanism
hypothesis, moreover, generates further predictions for testing. As noted in Study 1, Endress
and Bonatti have not reported experiments explicitly comparing preferences for part words
of type 12 versus part words of type 21. Our prediction, based on associative learning princi-
ples and our simulations, is that such experiments will show a preference for part words of
type 12 over part words of type 21 after 30 min or more of familiarization. Parsimony and
novel testable predictions are an added value that in our view may end up tipping the
balance against the dual-mechanism (MOM) hypothesis.
5. Conclusion
How many mechanisms are needed to analyze speech? According to the MOM hypothe-
sis (Endress and Bonatti, 2007; Peña et al., 2002a), language learning is achieved by means
of two mechanisms: a statistical mechanism that permits the learner to extract words from
the speech stream, together with a non-statistical mechanism that is necessary for extracting
higher level structure. We have presented a pair of neural network studies that show how
statistics alone can support the discovery of structural regularities, beyond the segmentation
of speech. We have argued that our results undermine Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti’s
argument for the MOM hypothesis, and we therefore conclude that they have not demon-
strated that rule-governed language-learning mechanisms are necessary for the extraction of
structural information.
Now, mastering a language requires behaving (e.g., producing utterances) in accordance
with non-adjacent dependencies, including long-distance dependencies. Common examples
in the literature include the sort of dependencies that are required for maintaining agreement
over lengthy center embeddings, as in ‘‘The cats who the dog bites run.’’ But the artificial
language of Peña et al. and Endress and Bonatti, which we have adopted here for the pur-
poses of direct comparison with their results, represents only a small subset of the full range
of non-adjacent dependencies found in natural languages. One might therefore question the
sense in which the studies reported here on structural rule learning in artificial language
acquisition relate to structural rule learning in natural language acquisition. Illustrations
abound, but simply consider parasynthesis, or infixation as cases where non-adjacent depen-
dencies occur at the morphosyntactic level. Probably, parasynthesis, infixation, or agree-
ment, are not straightforward natural language counterparts of the sort of non-adjacent
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dependencies that define artificial rule words in Peña et al.’s and Endress and Bonatti’s cor-
pora. However, insofar as their results are thought to back up the MOM hypothesis, our
modeling results may equally go beyond the idiosyncrasies of SRNs. Our work shows that a
primitive, artificial statistical learning mechanism can learn linguistic preferences that
appear to be governed by abstract, structural rules. There is no reason to think that the
powerful statistical learning machinery of the human brain could not do the same.
Note
1. Endress and Bonatti hypothesize the existence of ‘‘a general mechanism representing
syllables in words as variables, capable of operating under a variety of input condi-
tions. Such a mechanism would be able to extract relations between such variables
within their respective units… The silences may act as ‘markers’ that define the units
of an analysis. Such markers may be a prerequisite for dependencies between classes
in speech to be analyzed, and this would explain [why] the mechanism for generaliza-
tion seems to only work over an already segmented input’’ (p. 291).
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Appendix A: Supplemental information on methods
The words in the familiarization stream were randomly selected subject to the constraints
that (a) a word of a given family cannot be immediately followed by another word of the
same family; and (b) a word with a given intermediate syllable cannot be immediately fol-
lowed by another word with the same intermediate syllable.
The online methods supplement to the original paper (Peña, Bonatti, Nespor, & Mehler,
2002b) states that rule (b) is in effect (‘‘two words are not adjacent if they have the same
intermediate syllable,’’ p. 1). However, Fig. 1 of the original paper (Peña et al., 2002a) indi-
cates that the familiarization stream 1 contains the string puraki beliga tafodu pufoki talidu
beraga, which contains a violation of rule (b). Endress and Bonatti (2007) state that they
use rule (b) (viz. ‘‘Consecutive items could not belong to the same family, nor could they
have the same middle syllable,’’ in the description of the familiarization procedure for their
Experiment 1, p. 255). Thus, for the purpose of the simulations, we made an attempt to
constrain all training input according to rule (b).
However, there is a further issue, in that observing both of these constraints (a and b)
makes it difficult to generate a sequence of exactly the required length. Depending upon
how the initial words are randomly ordered, it can be impossible to place the last few words.
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As an extreme example, imagine that the sequence started as follows (the superscripts indi-
cate repetitions):
½pulikiberaga100½pufokibeliga100½purakibefoga100talidu
This sequence is only 601 words long, but it cannot be completed because all remaining
words are from the same family. Of course, pseudorandomly selecting words tends to avoid
such extreme examples. Nevertheless, a pseudorandom selection procedure remains suscep-
tible to less extreme forms of the problem: The placement of words earlier in the sequence
usually makes it impossible to place all words in the sequence while obeying constraints (a)
and (b). When the word sequence is generated stochastically, it is highly unlikely for the
problem to be this extreme. However, it is also unlikely that exactly 900 words can be used.
In one trial run, for example, only 48 of 1,000 randomly generated sequences were able to
use all 900 elements.
Perhaps of even greater concern, the sequences that do use all 900 elements tend to end
with relatively long sequences of alternating word pairs. This is because the procedure for
selecting words is essentially selection from a 900-element set without replacement. Thus,
the 900th word of a 900-word sequence has 0 entropy—it is the only option left in the pool.
The first 900-word sequence we generated by pseudorandom selection ended with 16
straight repetitions of ‘‘talidu, pufoki.’’
Appendix B: Descriptive and inferential statistics for Study 1
Mean cosine similarity values for each test item type after 50, 70, 100, and 200 epochs of
training are shown in Table B1.
A within-subject anova with test word type (four levels: class word, part word, rule word
and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity after 50 epochs of training as
the dependent variable indicated significant differences among the mean cosine similarity
values for test word types, F(3,147) = 5860.157, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple
comparisons indicated that all pairwise differences (including the relevant comparisons:
Table B1
Mean cosine similarity values at selected epochs for 50 networks trained and tested with gaps
Epochs
W RW CW PW PW12 PW21
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
50 0.834 0.023 0.794 0.042 0.312 0.035 0.069 0.016 0.073 0.031 0.065 0.021
70 0.931 0.043 0.888 0.062 0.160 0.037 0.083 0.043 0.121 0.090 0.045 0.021
100 0.959 0.054 0.916 0.071 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.062 0.153 0.132 0.026 0.018
200 0.915 0.136 0.813 0.166 0.055 0.053 0.106 0.077 0.203 0.157 0.008 0.015
Note. CW, class words; PW, part words; PW12, part words of type 12; PW21, part words of type 21 RW,
rule words; W, words.
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words vs. rule words, rule words vs. class words, and class words vs. part words) are signifi-
cant (p < .001 in all cases).
A within-subject anova with test word type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 70 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences
among test word types, F(3,147) = 4030.477, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple com-
parisons again indicated that all pairwise differences were significant (p < .001 in all cases).
A within-subject anova with test word type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 100 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences
among test word types, F(3,147) = 3158.695, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple com-
parisons indicated that all pairwise differences except the difference between part words
and class words were significant (p > .9 for part words vs. class words, p < .001 in all other
cases).
A within-subject anova with test word type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 100 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences
among test word types, F(3,147) = 862.222, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple com-
parisons indicated that all pairwise differences were significant (p = .004 for part words vs.
class words, p < .001 in all other cases).
A within-subject anova with test item type (five levels: class word, part word of type 12,
part word of type 21, rule word and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity
after 50 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences among
the mean cosine similarity values for test item types, F(4, 196) = 6060.826, p < .001. Bon-
ferroni-corrected multiple comparisons indicated that all pairwise differences are significant
(p < .001) except the difference of 0.008 between part words of type12 and part words of
type 21.
A within-subject anova with test item type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 70 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differ-
ences among the mean cosine similarity values for test item types, F(4, 196) = 2756.253,
p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple comparisons indicated that all pairwise differ-
ences are significant. Indeed, with the exception of the comparison between class words
and part words of type 12 (p = .013), all of the differences are very highly significant
(p < .001).
A within-subject anova with test item type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 100 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences
among the cosine similarity values for test item types, F(4,196) = 1838.041, p < .001. Bon-
ferroni-corrected multiple comparisons indicated that all pairwise differences are significant.
Indeed, with the exception of the comparison between class words and part words of type
12 (p = .030), all of the differences are very highly significant (p < .001).
A within-subject anova with test item type as the independent variable and cosine simi-
larity after 200 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicated significant differences
among the cosine similarity values for test item types, F(4,196) = 677.378, p < .001.
Bonferroni-corrected multiple comparisons indicated that all pairwise differences are very
highly significant (p < .001).
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Appendix C: Descriptive and inferential statistics for Study 2
Mean cosine similarity values for each test item type after 50 and 200 epochs of training
are shown in Table C1.
A within-subject anova with test word type (four levels: class word, part word, rule word,
and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity after 50 epochs of training as
the dependent variable indicates significant differences among the mean cosine similarity
values for test word types, F(3, 147) = 555.086, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple
comparisons indicate that the difference between part words and rule words is not significant
(p = .447; note that the variance for rule words is relatively high), but all other pairwise
differences are significant (p < .001).
A within-subject anova with test word type (four levels: class word, part word, rule word
and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity after 200 epochs of training as
the dependent variable indicates significant differences among the mean cosine similarity
values for test word types, F(3,147) = 147.441, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple
comparisons indicated that the difference between part words and rule words was significant
(p = .033), as were all other pairwise differences (p < .001).
A within-subject anova with test word type (five levels: class word, part word of type 12,
part word of type 21, rule word, and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity
after 50 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicates significant differences among
the mean cosine similarity values for test word types, F(4,196) = 481.368, p < .001. Bonfer-
roni-corrected multiple comparisons indicate that neither the difference between part words
of type 12 and rule words (p = .185) nor the difference between part words of type 21 and
rule words (p > .9) is significant, while all other pairwise comparisons—including the com-
parison between part words of type 12 and part words of type 21—are very highly signifi-
cant (p < .001). The fact that the difference between the two part word types (0.023) is
nearly same as the difference between part words of type 21 and rule words (0.022)—and
moreover the fact that the difference between part words of type 12 and rule words is even
bigger (0.045)—may seem puzzling, in light of the fact that the difference between the two
part word types is significant but the differences between either part word type and rule
words are not. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that the variance for rule words is
substantially higher than the variance for either type of part word.
Table C1
Mean cosine similarity values at selected epochs for 50 networks trained and tested without gaps
Epochs
W RW CW PW PW12 PW21
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
50 0.785 0.070 0.523 0.129 0.229 0.058 0.556 0.005 0.568 0.008 0.545 0.007
200 0.642 0.214 0.446 0.156 0.109 0.075 0.513 0.051 0.521 0.072 0.505 0.064
Note. CW, class words; PW, part words; PW12, part words of type 12; PW21, part words of type 21 RW,
rule words; W, words.
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A within-subject anova with test word type (five levels: class word, part word of type 12,
part word of type 21, rule word and word) as the independent variable and cosine similarity
after 200 epochs of training as the dependent variable indicates significant differences
among the mean cosine similarity values for test word types, F(4,196) = 128.973, p < .001.
Bonferroni-corrected multiple comparisons indicate that the difference between part words
of type 12 and part words of type 21 is not significant ( p > .9), nor is the difference between
part words of type 21 and rule words ( p = .118). The difference between part words of type
12 and rule words is significant ( p = .046), and all the other differences are highly signifi-
cant ( p < .005).
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